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U.S. Department of Agriculture
Office of the Secretary

THE DANGEROUS TIME
This is the most dangerous legislative period for American farming
in at least ten years.

Not since 1965, when low farm incomes and massive

crop surpluses forced the beginning of a radical shift in our farm policy
approach, has there existed as much potential for backward s.teps in our
farm program.
The nation made the right choice ten years ago.

Our farm programs

have gradually become more market-oriented and more export-oriented since
that time.

Acreage allotments and bases have been relaxed.

Farmers have

been given more management freedom, which they have used to increase their
productive efficiency.

Massive surpluses have been eliminated, allowing

market prices for farm commodities to improve dramatically.

Even after

the dramatic declines of recent months, they are far higher today than
they were 4 years ago--or 14 years ago.
substantially.

Net farm incomes have increased

1973 and 1974 have been the best income years U.S.

agriculture has ever had.

The nation is now using all of its farming

assets, and gaining substantial returns in the world marketplace.

Farm

export earnings have more than tripledr from about $6 billion a year in
the 1960's to more than $20 billion in each of the 1974 and 1975 fiscal
years.
Speech by Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Clayton K. Yeutter, before
the Professional Farmers of America meeting in Indianapolis, Indiana
March 13, 1975.

-2Present agricultural policy--a bipartisan policy developed under
both Democratic and Republican administrations in the Farm Acts of 1965,
1970 and 1973--is providing benefits for farmers, consumers, taxpayers,
and the nation.

Agriculture's contribution to our economy--measured by

gross output, full use of assets, balance of trade or farmer income--is
far greater than it ever was under the fruitless and futile policies of
"supply management'''.
But these gains are now being threatened.

This year we run a serious

risk of being thrown back into the Dark Ages of farm policy by an unusual
combination of events.
In the first place, we are coming off a period of strong farm prices.
World farm output has fallen short of demand in two out of the last three
years, due primarily to weather problems.

Farm product prices have been

relatively high, to ration the available supply.

Now, with the prospect

of more adequate supplies of farm commodities in the 1975 crop year,
prices have eased.

Understandably, many farmers are disturbed and concerned.

They want someone to arrest the price decline, and with their costs going
up, they'd like prices to go back up too.

This is particularly true of

those farmers who have not yet sold their 1974 crop, and who have not yet
hedged any part of their 1975 crop.

They are angry with themselves, for

having missed the the market's peak, and with anybody else who happens
to be in range.

They want somebody to help them recoup their lost

opportunities.
In the second place, the entire world has been in a severe economic
slump, induced partly by price increases of the oil cartel and partly by
a business cycle downturn in a number of industrialized countries.
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The slump in consumer demand produced by a widespread recession is having
a major impact on the markets for farm products.
Farmers are also very much afraid of rising production costs.

The

prices they pay for fertilizer, fuel, machinery, and other production items
have risen sharply in the past two years.

Farmers fear that further cost

inflation will combine with a falling price trend to put them in a loss
position.
Finally, there are still many people, in and out of agriculture,
who do not believe in our economic system.

They do not trust the market.

They have an almost mystic belief that the government can do a better
job of running this vast and intricate economic machine than the market
can despite all the evidence and experience to the contrary.

These people

are still selling the theory that farmers can be insulated from the
marketplace.

They offer the same set of gimmicks--price supports, direct

payments, storage programs, etc.--that have been used in vain for the
last 40 years.
These economic gimmicks have never succeeded in raising farm income to
satisfactory levels, and they never will.

For farmers to again put their

faith in such tomfoolery would be tragic.

No, these old supply management

programs didn't help farmers.

But they did succeed in costing taxpayers

billions of extra dollars for farm programs and commodity storage.

When

the inevitable production constraints came along, they did succeed in costing
consumers billions of dollars in higher food prices.
in pricing U.S. farm products out of the world market.
"achievements" wasn't it?

And, they did succeed
Quite a list of
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Yet government management of agriculture is now being put forward
again as the way to solve what proponents call a "farm emergency."
Proposals have been submitted in the Congress to sharply increase price
support loans, to boost target prices, to insure farmers from abnormalities
in weather, and to build huge grain reserves.

The price tags on these

proposals range as high as $50 billion over the next 5 years.
Direction is Crucial
I do not propose to discuss specific target prices or loan levels.
I want to make a more fundamental point about the direction of our farm
policy.
them.

We cannot insulate farmers from the market without smothering
We have not been able to insulate them in the past, and we are

even less able to insulate them in today's interdependent world economy.
The only farm policy that has effectively improved real farm
income has been market orientation.

That is also the policy which has

provided maximum benefit for the nation.
Attempting to set farmers apart through price guarantees and payments
will inevitably lead farmers down the same rocky road to nowhere that
they have traveled in past decades.
current proposals.

There is nothing new in any of the

Each of the techniques being proposed has been used

in the past, without achieving any of the gains that are being predicted
for them now.

The record of failure has already been written into the

pages of history on many an occasion.
learn from our past mistakes?
1975?

Are we not intelligent enough to

Do we really need to repeat them again in
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The Cycle of Failure
The cycle of failure will be inevitable:
First, target prices that are too high will bring on additional
production that the market does not want--not immediately, because we
have stocks to rebuild, but very soon.
~urpluses will begin to pile up.

Farm prices will begin to weaken,

I

in this country and around the world.

This will cause deficiency payments

to rise, and U.S. farmers will again get larger and larger shares of their
income from the federal trough.

The U.S. taxpayer will, of course, bear

this burden.
So long as taxpayers do not rebel at the size of deficiency payments,
the incentive to overproduce will continue.
prices will drop below U.S. loan levels.

Eventually, world market

And if those loan levels are set

relatively high--as in the legislation now pending before the Congress-"eventually" will come to pass in a big hurry.
cotton at 40¢ per pound.)
worlds.

(It is already here for

When this occurs, we have the worst of all

We have priced ourselves right out.S,te world market.

Competing exporters--Canada, Australia, Argentina, and others--will be
able to offer their farm products at a price a fraction below our loan
levels, and sell all the market will bear.
U.S. farmers get?
all they have.
If there is no

What share of the market will

Only what's left after their competitors have sold

This is what is meant by our becoming a "residual supplier."
11

residual 11 after our competitors have sold what they have

available, we won't sell anything.

Once we've lost these markets, it may

be years before we get them back, if ever.
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At that point, we have an alternative but not a very good one.
alternative is to use export subsidies.

The

In other words, the taxpayer has

to be willing to pick up the tab for the difference between our loan levels
and the world market price.

The government did that some vears ago, but

the memories are not fond ones.

Witness the experience with export

subsidies during the Soviet grain transactions of 1972.
As deficiency payments, export subsidies, or both begin to cost more
and more, the taxpayer eventually rebels and says "Isn't there a better
way to run this store?"
is--production controls.

From the government's standpoint, of course there
Why?

Because it is less costly to the Federal

government to take land out of production than it is to pay deficiency
payments, storage costs, and export subsidies.

So we begin once again

to pay farmers not to farm.
There are, of course, some hidden costs to this system too.

For

farmers, it is the harassment of governmental involvement in their business.
They are told what to grow, where to grow it, and how to market it.

Not

a very attractive prospect in a free enterprise society, particularly for
people who pride themselves on their independence.
higher food costs.

As farm land is taken out of production, the U.S.

agricultural plant becomes less efficient.
etc.--have to be spread over fewer acres.
efficiency?

For consumers, it is

The farmer--certainly.

Fixed costs--taxes, depreciation,
And who pays for that reduced

But the consumer too, in the price

of food items.
Besides, consumers are taxpayers too, 'and must absorb the cost of
set-aside payments, and any storage costs, export subsidies, and deficiency
payments that still remain.
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Only competing export nations,

to whom we hand world markets on a silver platter.

Importing nations

may benefit temporarily from lowered world price levels, but they lose
in the long run too as we begin to restrict production.
benefit temporarily for the very same reason.

Our own consumers

But in the long run--and

"long" isn't very long--everybody in the U.S. loses.
We have gone through this cycle of failure before.

Why, oh why,

would we want to do it again?!
A Farm Emergency?
One of the mysteries of the current farm policy proposals is that
they are all aimed at helping crop producers.

And yet most crop producers

have just had the two best years of their lives.
Much of the crisis atmosphere seems to be based on inflated farm
cost estimates.

For example, one group of corn growers in Central Iowa

claimed an estimated production cost of $2.40 a bushel.

USDA's Economic

Research Service estimated production costs in northern Indiana--a
competitive area--at$1.79 per bushel.

Much of the difference is explained

by the fact that the Iowa estimate included labor charges at $9.52 an
hour, and land valued at $1350 an acre--$450 above Iowa State University's
estimate.
The same situation applies in wheat and soybeans; many production
cost estimates have been inflated with unspecified "marketing charges,"
or "management charges."
The ballooning of land values is probably the most widely practiced
sin of all, when figuring production costs.

Even the ERS estimate of

$1.79 per bushel for corn production included 67 cents for return to land.
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Economists question whether land values should be included at all, because
land values are the result of farm profits or losses rather than the cause.
When farm profits are good, farm land values go up.
well, farm land values do not go up.

When farmers do less

Overall, farm land values in the U.S.

have jumped 42 percent in the past two years--indicating that farmers have
been doing very well indeed!

But what percentage of these land values is

the U.S. public obliged to protect?
The Real Problem is Not Farming At All
Actually, the debate over target prices and supports misses the point
entirely.

We do not have a farm emergency.

We have an economic emergency.

It was brought on by public spending deficits, by the oil crisis and by
cyclical business factors.

There is no farm policy that can or should

guarantee an artificial farm prosperity in the midst of an international
recession.

From the farmers' standpoint, it would be far better to attack

the overall economic problem promptly and effectively--as President Ford
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has urged repeatedly--tHen to resurrect the worn-out farm policy mistakes
of the past.
Government intervention will be no more effective for farmers in the
1970's than it was in the 1930's, 40's, 50's, or 60's.

In fact it would

be even more harmful, because the nation and its farmers depend so much
more heavily today on international farm markets.

And billions of additional

government farm program dollars would aggravate the inflation problem that
still plagues us.
There are plenty of good reasons for everyone to oppose this big step
backward into a government-managed agriculture.

It has been a big loser

in the past, and it is still a big loser--for all of us.

